Social Cognitive Neuroscience of Person Perception: A Selective Review Focused on the Event-Related Brain Potential. by Bartholow, Bruce D & Dickter, Cheryl L.
W&M ScholarWorks 
Arts & Sciences Book Chapters Arts and Sciences 
2007 
Social Cognitive Neuroscience of Person Perception: A Selective 
Review Focused on the Event-Related Brain Potential. 
Bruce D. Bartholow 
Cheryl L. Dickter 
College of William and Mary, cldickter@wm.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/asbookchapters 
 Part of the Cognition and Perception Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bartholow, B. D., & Dickter, C. L. (2007). Social Cognitive Neuroscience of Person Perception: A Selective 
Review Focused on the Event-Related Brain Potential.. E. Harmon-Jones & P. Winkielman (Ed.), Social 
neuroscience: Integrating biological and psychological explanations of social behavior (pp. 376-400). New 
York, NY: Guilford Press. https://scholarworks.wm.edu/asbookchapters/46 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts and Sciences at W&M ScholarWorks. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
V
PERSON PERCEPTION,
STEREOTYPING,
AND PREJUDICE
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 $
{D
at
e}
. $
{P
ub
lis
he
r}
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
17
Social Cognitive Neuroscience
of Person Perception
A SELECTIVE REVIEW FOCUSED ON
THE EVENT-RELATED BRAIN POTENTIAL
Bruce D. Bartholow and Cheryl L. Dickter
Although social psychologists have long been interested in understanding
the cognitive processes underlying social phenomena (e.g., Markus &
Zajonc, 1985), their methods for studying them traditionally have been
rather limited. Early research in person perception, like most other areas of
social-psychological inquiry, relied primarily on verbal reports. Researchers
using this approach have devised clever experimental designs to ensure the
validity of their conclusions concerning social behavior (see Reis & Judd,
2000). The cognitive revolution of the 1970s and 1980s provided a new
conceptual model derived in part from a computer metaphor of human
thought, involving input (perception), information processing (cognition),
and output (behavior), as well as new methods for examining the mental
operations underlying social behavior that did not depend on participants’
self-reports (e.g., response latency; see Fazio, 1990).
Recently, another conceptual shift has occurred, based on the notion
that complex human behaviors cannot be fully explicated by either a
strictly biological or a strictly social-psychological approach (e.g., Cacioppo,
Berntson, Sheridan, & McClintock, 2000). That is, although human beings
(and therefore human behaviors) are inherently social, a purely social level
of analysis may ignore or misrepresent important biological events that
mediate human action. At the same time, reducing behavior to its biologi-
cal underpinnings generally does not satisfactorily account for situational
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differences in behavioral expression. In contrast, a social neuroscience (or
social cognitive neuroscience) approach is based on the premise that the
most comprehensive understanding of a host of psychological processes is
achieved only by examining them at social, cognitive, and neural levels of
analysis (Ochsner, 2004; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). The aim of this
chapter is to review recent developments in social cognitive neuroscience
associated with one admittedly narrow topic in the field of social psychol-
ogy, that of person perception, and specifically to review work that exam-
ines this topic through one primary technique—the event-related brain
potential (ERP). We begin with a brief overview of ERP theory and mea-
surement (for more comprehensive reviews of the theory and methods of
ERP research, see Fabiani, Gratton, & Coles, 2000) and conclude by
reviewing recent research in which ERPs have been used as a tool for
addressing theoretical questions in person perception.
ERPS AND HUMAN INFORMATION PROCESSING
Background and Theory
Hans Berger (1929) first demonstrated that it is possible to record the elec-
trical activity of the human brain (the electroencephalogram; EEG) by plac-
ing a pair of electrodes on the surface of the scalp connected to a differen-
tial amplifier. When stimuli are presented during EEG recording, epochs of
the EEG that are time-locked to stimulus onset can be defined. With
repeated samplings of data from epochs time-locked to the same stimulus
(or stimulus class), EEG activity that is not time-locked to stimulus onset
will vary randomly across epochs and thus tend to average to zero; the
remaining average waveform reflects activity associated directly with pro-
cessing of the stimulus in question (i.e., the ERP). Physiologically, ERPs are
assumed to reflect the postsynaptic activity of groups of neurons that
are active synchronously and that share an electrical field orientation
that permits their effects at the scalp to cumulate. Psychologically, ERP
components—positive and negative voltage deflections in the waveform—
reflect various sensory, cognitive, and motor processes based on their
responsiveness to experimental manipulations (see Fabiani et al., 2000;
Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & Coles, 1995; Stern, Ray, & Quigley,
2001).
Deriving the ERP
ERPs are recorded with an array of electrodes placed on the scalp (usually
fixed in a nylon-lycra cap) according to standard location conventions (e.g.,
the 10–20 international electrode placement system; Jasper, 1958). The
electrodes are connected to amplifiers, and the outputs of the amplifiers
are converted to numbers using an analog-to-digital converter. Electrical
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potentials are generally sampled at a frequency ranging from 100 to 10,000
Hz (samples per second); sampling rates of 250–1,000 Hz are common.
Potentials may be recorded continuously during an experimental session (in
which case epochs are defined later) or during predefined epochs around
stimulus or response events. Deriving the ERP from the raw EEG begins
with attenuating (filtering) portions of the EEG that are not of interest. A
typical filter setting for recording ERPs will attenuate frequencies above
30–40 Hz (low-pass filter) and those below approximately 0.5 Hz (high-
pass filter). Large artifacts in the data, typically defined as voltage deflec-
tions larger than some criterion (e.g., 100 µV), also must be removed or
attenuated; this is typically accomplished with automated, regression-based
procedures (e.g., Semlitsch, Anderer, Schuster, & Presslich, 1986).
ERP Components and their Interpretation
Components are typically described according to their polarity (positive or
negative) and the latency (in milliseconds) at which they typically peak.
Component amplitude reflects the extent of neural activation associated
with a particular cognitive operation, whereas component latency reflects
the time required to carry out that operation (e.g., Gehring, Gratton,
Coles, & Donchin, 1992; Rugg & Coles, 1995). Although a group of very
short-latency exogenous components is elicited in the ERP, most social
neuroscientists focus on the longer latency endogenous components (see
Figure 17.1), which are associated with higher cognitive processes such as
those typically of interest to social psychologists (e.g., attention, memory,
evaluation, categorization).
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FIGURE 17.1. A schematic representation of endogenous ERP components elic-
ited by a novel visual stimulus. Very early components (approximately 0–100 ms
after stimulus onset; i.e., exogenous components) tend to be described with a differ-
ent nomenclature and are not typically examined in social neuroscience research.
The vertical arrow on the timeline represents stimulus onset (i.e., time zero); the
100 milliseconds preceding time zero represents a hypothetical prestimulus baseline
period. Negative voltage is plotted up as a matter of convention, though ERPs are
not always presented this way.
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Notable endogenous components include the N100, P200, N200, and
P300. Both the N100 and P200 (also sometimes called the P1 because it is
the first notable positive peak) have been linked to attentional processes
(see Fabiani et al., 2000; Rugg & Coles, 1995), with increasing amplitude
of the components reflecting increased direction of implicit attention to a
stimulus (e.g., Hopfinger & Mangun, 2001; Mangun, Hillyard, & Luck,
1993). In social neuroscience work, the N100 and P200 have been associ-
ated with automatic direction of attention to negative relative to posi-
tive information (Bartholow, Pearson, Gratton, & Fabiani, 2003; Smith,
Cacioppo, Larsen, & Chartrand, 2003) and increased attention to out-
group relative to in-group members (Ito, Thompson, & Cacioppo, 2004;
Ito & Urland, 2003). The N200 has been associated both with stimu-
lus infrequency (e.g. (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Van Den Wildenberg, &
Ridderinkhof, 2003; Squires, Squires, & Hillyard, 1975) and with conflict
between the response demands associated with concurrent tasks (i.e.,
response conflict; see Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001).
One of the most widely studied endogenous components of the ERP is
the P300, a large positive component that usually peaks between 300 and
800 milliseconds. The P300 has been associated with the brain’s response
to novelty (Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001) in that P300 amplitude
increases as the subjective probability of an eliciting event decreases (e.g.,
Donchin & Coles, 1988; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; Squires et al.,
1975; see also Nieuwendhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005). The P300 has
been described as a manifestation of context updating in working memory,
based on numerous studies indicating better subsequent memory for stimuli
that elicit larger P300 amplitude (e.g., Donchin, 1981; Donchin & Coles,
1988; Friedman & Johnson, 2000). The latency at which the P300 peaks
serves as a neural indicator of stimulus evaluation or categorization time,
with longer latencies indicating more effortful categorization (see Coles,
1989). It is not uncommon for the P300 to peak substantially later than
300 milliseconds; in tasks involving complex social or emotional stimuli,
peaks often occur between 550 and 800 milliseconds. Thus, some research-
ers refer to this component more generically as the “late positive poten-
tial,” or LLP, to refer to its general time course and polarity without refer-
ence to a specific temporal anchor (e.g., see Cacioppo, Crites, Gardner, &
Berntson, 1994, 1995; Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998).
Why Use ERPs to Study Person Perception?
Person perception research has a deep and important history in social psy-
chology, involving such seminal topics as stereotyping, causal attribution,
impression formation, and expectancy effects, to name just a few (see
Jones, 1990, for a review). It goes without saying that the behavioral meth-
ods typically used in person perception research, including recall (i.e., per-
son memory), response latency, and self-reported evaluations (among oth-
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ers; see Olson, Roese, & Zanna, 1996), have provided a strong foundation
for advancing our understanding of how people come to know what others
are “really like” (Jones, 1990). However, the nature of the cognitive and
affective processes thought to be important in driving person perception
makes certain theoretical questions difficult to address when using such
methods alone. For example, when participants are better able to recall
information about people in one condition versus another, we infer that the
information in the former condition received more extensive processing
than the information in the latter condition. In this sense, recall represents
one outcome of some cognitive activity associated with memory, but a
number of processes likely intervene between stimulus encoding and recall
that are not well represented in a memory measure. ERPs can provide a
direct index of such intervening processes.
A related issue concerns the temporal specificity of cognitive measures.
A number of theoretical models (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg,
1990) posit multiple steps or stages of person perception, each of which
may represent a distinct cognitive process or set of processes. Given that
most social cognitive processes are assumed to unfold very quickly (e.g.,
Bargh, 1997; Higgins, 1996), behavioral and self-report measures are not
especially well suited to represent them as they happen. In contrast, the
temporal specificity of the ERP makes it an ideal measure for examining
hypothesized sequential components of information processing involved in
person perception (e.g., see Ito et al., 2004), allowing identification of vari-
ous stages of processing that mediate the link between perception and overt
behavior (e.g., see Rugg & Coles, 1995). Even the act of responding to
stimuli (as with a response latency measure) can introduce noise into the
data associated with response preparation and execution, effectively con-
founding relevant cognitive processes with irrelevant motor-related pro-
cesses. In this regard, P300 latency provides an advantage over more tradi-
tional measures of processing time (e.g., response latency) in that it is
independent of behavioral responses (though it often correlates with
response latency; see McCarthy & Donchin, 1981). Thus this measure
serves as an indicator of stimulus categorization time that is not con-
founded with the duration of response-related motor processes or task-
relevant response selection requirements (Ito & Cacioppo, 2000; Kutas,
McCarthy, & Donchin, 1975; McCarthy & Donchin, 1981; Smid, Mulder,
Mulder, & Brands, 1992). This issue is particularly relevant for researchers
interested in separating relatively automatic from more controlled pro-
cesses. Another advantage is that the brain activity represented by ERPs
generally is less controllable than self-reported data, thereby reducing con-
cerns with self-presentational biases and permitting examination of the
effects of a stimulus that individuals are either unable or unwilling to
report.
P300 amplitude is particularly relevant for research in person percep-
tion for several reasons. First, the P300 can index the effects of probabilis-
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tic beliefs such as stereotypes and expectancies on perceivers’ implicit reac-
tions to others (see Ito & Cacioppo, 2007). Second, given the link between
the P300 and working memory processes (see Friedman & Johnson, 2000),
P300 amplitude can serve as an online, neural marker for person memory
effects (see Bartholow, Fabiani, Gratton, & Bettencourt, 2001). Third, the
P300 is known to index evaluative categorization (e.g., Ito & Cacioppo,
1999), a fundamental aspect of differentiating friend from foe. Finally,
research suggests that the P300 can reveal task-irrelevant categorization
processes (Ito & Cacioppo, 2000) and therefore may indicate implicit cog-
nitive processes of which the participant is unaware.
In addition to these cognitive processes, affective processes also play a
central role in many models of person perception. As one example, some
models of expectancy processes (e.g., Burgoon, 1993; Mandler, 1990) pre-
dict that perceivers experience affective arousal when others behave in
unexpected ways. However, the precise nature of these affective reactions
has been debated. Some models (e.g., Mandler, 1990; Olson et al., 1996)
predict that expectancy violations will always result in negative affect for
the perceiver (at least initially) because unpredictability and uncertainty are
generally unpleasant. Other models (e.g., Bettencourt, Dill, Greathouse,
Charlton, & Mulholland, 1997; Kernahan, Bartholow, & Bettencourt,
2000), however, predict that the affective reaction to an expectancy viola-
tion depends on the valence of the violating information. As we review
later, the temporal specificity of electrophysiological measures can allow
direct tests of these theoretical assertions that have been difficult to obtain
with self-report measures.
ERP STUDIES OF PERSON PERCEPTION
Cacioppo and his colleagues (Cacioppo, Crites, Berntson, & Coles, 1993)
were among the first to study social perception using ERPs. These research-
ers reasoned that because the P300 serves as an index of subjective proba-
bility in categorization processes (e.g., Donchin & Coles, 1988; Friedman
et al., 2001), it also should mark the implicit categorization of evaluatively
consistent and inconsistent attitude objects. Early research by this group
(e.g., Cacioppo, Crites, Berntson, & Coles, 1993) supported this hypothe-
sis, showing that P300 amplitude was enhanced when participants implic-
itly categorized attitude words that differed in valence from a preceding
context established by other attitude words. Similar research showed that
the P300 to evaluative categorization (e.g., good, bad) differs from that
to nonevaluative categorization (e.g., vegetable, nonvegetable; Crites &
Cacioppo, 1996). Extending this paradigm to person perception, Cacioppo,
Crites, Gardner, and Berntson (1994) showed that the P300 also indexes
evaluative categorization of positive and negative personality traits and
that this effect is associated with categorization per se rather than with
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response processes (Crites, Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1995), sug-
gesting that the P300 might assess implicit interpersonal attitudes.
Expectancies and Expectancy Violation
Based in part on the findings of Cacioppo and colleagues, Bartholow
et al. (2001) reasoned that cognitive activity associated with interpersonal
expectancy violations also should be manifest in P300 amplitude. A
large literature in social and developmental psychology indicates that
expectancy-violating information about people tends to be recalled better
than expectancy-confirming information (e.g., Stangor & McMillan,
1992). Theoretical models (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1989) posit that this recall
advantage reflects updating of working memory that occurs as people
attempt to reconcile the discrepancy between new information and existing
“person concepts,” a process generally known as inconsistency resolution.
The long-standing notion that the P300 is an electrocortical index of work-
ing memory updating (e.g., Donchin, 1981; Donchin & Coles, 1988; Fried-
man & Johnson, 2000) suggests that the amplitude of this component
should reflect the neural processes associated with inconsistency resolution.
To test these assertions, Bartholow and colleagues (2001) asked partic-
ipants to read paragraph descriptions of several fictitious individuals in
order to form impressions of them and then to read sentences (presented
one word at a time on a computer monitor) depicting behaviors that were
either consistent or inconsistent with those impressions. The valence of trait
information was varied so that physiological responses to both positive and
negative expectancy violations could be compared (Bettencourt et al.,
1997; Olson et al., 1996). To examine affective reactions to expectancy
violations, Bartholow et al. (2001) recorded the electrical activity of the
corrugator supercilii muscle (under the brow) using electromyography
(EMG). Previous research had established activity of the corrugator as an
index of negative affective reactions that may be too small or too fleeting to
be noticed with the “naked eye” (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim,
1986; see also, e.g., Dimberg & Petterson, 2000; Hess, Blairy, & Kleck,
2000; Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997).
As predicted, Bartholow et al. (2001) found that expectancy-violating
behaviors elicited larger P300 amplitude than did expectancy-consistent
behaviors (see Figure 17.2). Similarly, expectancy-violating behaviors sub-
sequently were recalled better than expectancy-consistent behaviors, sup-
porting the idea that the P300 reflects working memory updating during
person perception. Moreover, although earlier research suggested that the
P300 to evaluatively inconsistent words was similar in amplitude regardless
of word valence (Cacioppo et al., 1993), Bartholow et al. (2001) found that
P300 effects were larger to inconsistent negative behaviors than to inconsis-
tent positive behaviors (see Figure 17.2, bottom panel), consistent with
the literature on positive–negative asymmetry in person perception (e.g.,
382 PERSON PERCEPTION, STEREOTYPING, AND PREJUDICE
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Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Reeder & Coovert, 1986; Ybarra, Schaberg, &
Keiper, 1999) and with other ERP evidence that supports an implicit
negativity bias (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998). Finally, facial EMG
data indicated that the corrugator was activated by negative but not by
positive expectancy-violating behaviors, supporting the notion that valence
is an important determinant of affective reactions to expectancy violation
(e.g., Bettencourt et al., 1997).
Bartholow et al.’s (2001) findings indicated that the recall advan-
tage long known to accompany expectancy violations (e.g., Stangor &
McMillan, 1992) results from evaluative categorization processes occurring
Person Perception and ERPs 383
FIGURE 17.2. Difference waveforms representing effects of expectancy violation
(top panel) and behavior valence (bottom panel) in the ERP recorded at the Pz
(midline parietal) electrode site. Difference waveforms were created by subtracting
amplitudes elicited by irrelevant behaviors from those elicited by expectancy-violat-
ing and expectancy-consistent behaviors (top panel), and from negative and positive
behaviors (bottom panel). From Bartholow, Fabiani, Gratton, and Bettencourt
(2001). Copyright 2001 by the Association for Psychological Science. Reprinted by
permission.
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very rapidly following perception and strongly implicates a role for work-
ing memory—one of a host of so-called executive cognitive functions
thought to be mediated by activity in the prefrontal cortex—in the process
of inconsistency resolution (see also Macrae, Bodenhausen, Schloersheidt,
& Milne, 1999). To further explore the role of executive working memory
in the inconsistency resolution processes reflected in the P300, Bartholow
et al. (2003) conducted an experiment in which participants consumed
either a moderate (0.40 g/kg ethanol) or high (0.80 g/kg ethanol) dose of
alcohol or a placebo beverage just prior to engaging in the person-
perception task used by Bartholow et al. (2001). Theory (e.g., Steele &
Josephs, 1990) and research (e.g., Herzog, 1999) on the effects of alcohol
has suggested that controlled processes are impaired following consump-
tion but that automatic processes are relatively unaffected. Inconsistency
resolution arguably involves both automatic (e.g., early direction of atten-
tion to novel or salient information) and controlled (e.g., comparison of
new information with preexisting person concepts) components. Moreover,
alcohol’s effects on interpersonal behaviors are commonly attributed to
impairment of executive cognitive functions thought to be mediated by
the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Hoaken, Giancola, & Pihl, 1998; Peterson,
Rothfleisch, Zelazo, & Pihl, 1990; Steele & Josephs, 1990). Given these
factors and the evidence suggesting an important role for executive func-
tion in person perception (e.g., Macrae et al., 1999), Bartholow et al.
(2003) reasoned that inconsistency resolution might be impaired during
intoxication and used ERPs to specify which processes would be affected.
The main findings from this experiment are presented in Figure 17.3.
For participants in the placebo condition, the ERP results largely replicated
those of the earlier report (Bartholow et al., 2001), in that (negative)
expectancy-violating behaviors presented in a positive context elicited
enhanced P300 amplitude compared with expectancy-consistent behaviors,
whereas (positive) expectancy-violating behaviors presented in a negative
context did not. This finding is consistent with other data indicating that
negative expectancy violations elicit more processing than do positive
expectancy violations (e.g., Sherman & Frost, 2000; Trafimow & Finlay,
2001; Ybarra, Schaberg, & Keiper, 1999; see also Ybarra, 2002). For par-
ticipants in the alcohol conditions, however, the opposite pattern emerged,
with generally larger expectancy-violation effects associated with positive
behaviors presented in a negative context. This reversal likely reflects the
effects of alcohol-induced activation of the cerebral reward system on
working memory operations associated with processing reward-congruent
stimuli (see London, Ernst, Grant, Bonson, & Weinstein, 2000). These dif-
ferential patterns of processing as a function of valence were corroborated
by recall data. Whereas participants in the placebo condition recalled
more negative expectancy-violating behaviors, those in the alcohol condi-
tions recalled more positive expectancy-violating behaviors. Importantly,
though, alcohol did not appear to disrupt the direction of attention to nega-
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tive information in early processing stages. The N100 component was
larger to negative than to positive behaviors among all participants, regard-
less of alcohol dose. This finding is consistent with prior research suggest-
ing that alcohol does not disrupt relatively automatic aspects of person
perception (Herzog, 1999) and that, instead, its effects are limited to some-
what later, more effortful processing stages associated with working mem-
ory updating. Distinguishing alcohol’s effects on these two stages of pro-
cessing would not have been possible in this paradigm using a recall
measure alone. This study also illustrates the use of alcohol as a tool in
social neuroscience research. Given that many social cognitive phenomena
are presumed to be mediated by prefrontal cortical activity, examining
social cognitive processes in healthy individuals temporarily impaired by
alcohol provides a method for bridging gaps between research in neuropsy-
Person Perception and ERPs 385
FIGURE 17.3. Event-related brain potential waveforms measured at the Pz
(midline parietal) electrode as a function of alcohol dose, valenced expectancy con-
text, and consistency of behaviors with expectancies. The vertical arrow on the
timeline represents stimulus onset. From Bartholow, Pearson, Gratton, and Fabiani
(2003). Copyright 2003 by American Psychological Association. Reprinted by per-
mission.
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chology, social cognition, and cognitive neuroscience, literatures that tradi-
tionally have been largely segregated (see also Macrae et al., 1999).
Social Categorization: Processes and Consequences
A major focus of person perception research over the past 50 years has
been on understanding the influence of perceiving others as members of
social categories. However, this research is made difficult by participants’
unwillingness or inability to divulge their true reactions to others, particu-
larly on issues pertaining to out-group prejudice. In this regard, ERPs
can provide relevant information concerning how differential categoriza-
tion covertly influences information processing and ultimately behavioral
responses.
A study by Osterhout, Bersick, and McLaughlin (1997) provided an
early example of the use of ERPs to study the covert effects of social catego-
rization. Participants were presented with sentences that violated defini-
tional (e.g., “The fireman took a shower after she got home”) or stereotypi-
cal (e.g., “Our aerobics instructor gave himself a break”) noun–pronoun
agreement (or violated neither) while ERPs were recorded. The results
showed that both definitionally and stereotypically incongruent sentences
elicited enhanced P300 amplitude. Moreover, these ERP effects were inde-
pendent of participants’ judgments of grammatical and syntactical accept-
ability, highlighting the effectiveness of ERPs in revealing implicit judgment
processes.
In a more recent series of experiments, Ito and her colleagues (Ito &
Cacioppo, 2000; Ito et al., 2004; Ito & Urland, 2003) have used ERPs to
examine implicit and explicit aspects of categorization (for a more compre-
hensive review of physiological measures of implicit cognition, see Ito &
Cacioppo, 2007). In one such study, Ito and Cacioppo (2000) found
enhanced P300 amplitude to negative images and to images of people
(compared with objects), regardless of whether participants were explicitly
categorizing the images. Also, consistent with many of the studies reviewed
here (see also Bartholow et al., 2001; Bartholow et al., 2003; Ito et al.,
1998), Ito and Cacioppo (2000) found larger effects of evaluative inconsis-
tency with negative as compared with positive targets. In two follow-up
experiments, Ito and Urland (2003) showed that several ERP components
are sensitive to implicit racial and gender categorization processes. Early
components, such as the N100 and P200, appeared sensitive to processing
of race and gender information, with larger amplitudes indicating more
cognitive resources devoted to processing images of blacks and men,
respectively. Later working memory-related processes, as indexed by the
P300, were activated by individuals whose racial or gender categories dif-
fered from that of the social context established by the preceding images.
Another recent study by this group (Ito et al., 2004) showed that the
evaluative categorization effects reflected in the P300 correlated with
386 PERSON PERCEPTION, STEREOTYPING, AND PREJUDICE
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perceivers’ level of explicit prejudice toward out-group members, establish-
ing P300 amplitude as an implicit measure of out-group bias that, unlike
other implicit measures (e.g., Implicit Association Test; see Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), requires no behavioral response.
When combined with behavioral measures, ERPs can also reveal the
cognitive processes associated with the behavioral expression of racial bias.
Because racial stereotypes are so pervasive in American culture, the be-
havior of white Americans—even those who believe themselves to be
egalitarian—is often unintentionally biased against blacks. In other words,
whites who are low in prejudice often face situations in which their egali-
tarian goals are in conflict with behavioral tendencies engendered by the
automatic activation of stereotypes (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998). Such situ-
ations exemplify response conflict—that is, prepotent, well-learned re-
sponses are in conflict with less automatic, goal-driven behaviors (see
Botvinick et al., 2001). Two neural systems are posited to produce intended
behaviors when conflict arises: a conflict-detection system that monitors
ongoing responses for occasions of conflict and a regulatory control system
designed to implement intended responses once conflict has been detected.
Amodio and his colleagues (2004) used ERPs to examine whether
race-biased responses occur because the conflict-detection system fails to
recognize that a given behavior is at odds with an individual’s non-
prejudiced beliefs. These researchers presented participants with trials in
which a black or white face prime was followed by an image of either a
gun or a tool. The participants’ task was to categorize the second image
(gun or tool) by pressing one of two buttons. Previous research using this
paradigm (e.g., Payne, 2001) had established that participants are more
likely to miscategorize tools as guns following black primes than follow-
ing white primes, revealing racial bias associated with the stereotype that
blacks are violent. As a neural index of conflict detection associated with
this bias, Amodio et al. (2004) measured the amplitude of the error-
related negativity (ERN) on miscategorization trials. The ERN is a
response-locked ERP component that peaks within 100 milliseconds after
a response and is thought to reflect activation of the conflict-detection
system (see Botvinick et al., 2001; but also see Bartholow et al., 2005).
As predicted, the conflict-detection system was more strongly engaged on
trials in which a tool was mistaken for a gun following black primes
(black–tool error) than following White primes (White-tool error). Never-
theless, participants were much more likely to mistake a tool for a gun
on Black prime trials (see Amodio et al., 2004, Figure 2), indicating that
racially biased responses occur despite the brain’s detection of the conflict
inherent in those responses and suggesting that bias might result from
failure of the regulatory control system to overcome well-learned (though
unintentional) response tendencies.
In a recent test of this latter possibility, Bartholow, Dickter, and Sestir
(2006) examined the influence of stereotype activation on biased respond-
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ing using a task designed to assess the role of the regulatory control system
in withholding prejudiced responses. An important aspect of self-regulation
of behavior is the ability to inhibit well-learned but potentially maladaptive
responses in favor of other responses that are more appropriate in a given
context (e.g., MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000). Experimental
tests of inhibitory control often involve the use of “go–stop” paradigms
that engage participants in responding to “go” signals while “stop” signals
occasionally inform them to withhold their responses (see Logan &
Cowan, 1984). In such paradigms, responding in the presence of a stop sig-
nal represents a failure of the regulatory control system to implement top-
down inhibitory control.
Bartholow et al. (2006) used a go–stop racial priming paradigm in
which participants responded to trait adjectives associated with stereotypes
of blacks (e.g., violent, athletic) and whites (e.g., educated, uptight) or to
control words (descriptors of houses) following pictures of black or white
faces or pictures of houses. Their task was to indicate (via a key press)
whether or not each word could ever be true of the person (or house) that
preceded it (see Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986). On one-fourth of the tri-
als, a stop signal appeared shortly after the trait adjective, indicating that
no response should be made. To the extent that face primes activate racial
stereotypes, stereotype-consistent responses should be facilitated and more
inhibitory control should be required to withhold responses on stereotype-
consistent stop trials (e.g., a black face followed by violent) than on
stereotype-violation stop trials (e.g., a black face followed by educated).
Bartholow et al. (2006) measured the frequency of inhibition errors (i.e.,
failures to inhibit) in participants’ responses, as well as the amplitude of the
negative slow wave (NSW), a stimulus-locked ERP component that devel-
ops late in trial epochs (see Figure 17.1) and indexes activity in the regula-
tory control system (see West & Alain, 1999).
As an additional manipulation of cognitive control of inhibition,
Bartholow et al. (2006) assigned participants to one of three alcohol dose
conditions, as in previous research (Bartholow et al., 2003). A substantial
number of studies have indicated that moderate doses of alcohol signifi-
cantly impair behavioral inhibition but have no effect on the activation and
implementation of responses (e.g., Easdon & Vogel-Sprott, 2000; Fillmore
& Vogel-Sprott, 2000; Mulvihill, Skilling, & Vogel-Sprott, 1997) and that
these effects stem specifically from alcohol’s impairment of the regulatory
cognitive control system (Abroms, Fillmore, & Marczinski, 2003; Easdon
& Vogel-Sprott, 2000). Recent ERP evidence (Curtin & Fairchild, 2003)
has shown that these effects are evident in an alcohol-induced reduction of
NSW amplitude that correlates with behavioral undercontrol. Therefore,
alcohol provides an excellent tool for testing hypotheses associated with the
role of regulatory control in expression of racial bias. Bartholow et al.
(2006) reasoned that alcohol’s effects on regulatory control should result in
a dose-dependent increase in the frequency of inhibition errors, but only (or
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primarily) on stereotype-consistent trials, which should be most difficult to
inhibit. This pattern of impairment also was predicted for NSW amplitude,
with smaller amplitude of the component reflecting less effective implemen-
tation of regulatory cognitive control.
The primary findings from Bartholow et al.’s (2006, Experiment 2)
study are presented in Figure 17.4. As predicted, the inhibition error
data (Figure 17.4a) indicated a linear increase in failures to inhibit on
stereotype-consistent trials as a function of alcohol dose, but no significant
effect of alcohol on stereotype-violation trials. The ERP waveforms (Figure
17.4b) nicely mirrored the behavioral data. First, the amplitude of the
NSW was significantly reduced by alcohol, consistent with the idea that
alcohol impairs cognitive control (Curtin & Fairchild, 2003). More impor-
tant, stereotype-consistent trials elicited larger NSW amplitude than did
stereotype-violation trials, but only among those in the placebo group. This
finding supports the idea that withholding dominant, prejudiced responses
engages more regulative cognitive control resources and that this process is
impaired following alcohol consumption. Although the data presented in
Figure 17.4a are restricted to the middle fronto-central electrode location,
this effect was fairly broadly distributed over frontal, central, and anterior
parietal scalp regions. These data indicate that intact regulatory control is a
critical component of inhibiting unintentional race-biased behaviors. These
data also suggest that motivation to control prejudice (e.g., Plant &
Devine, 1998; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002) is only
part of what determines whether or not bias will be expressed; a high level
of motivation to exert control might not be enough to ensure unbiased
responding when regulatory control is impaired. These findings, along with
those of Amodio et al. (2004), provide important evidence of the neural
underpinnings of racial bias and its control.
Racial Priming Effects: ERP Evidence of Response Conflict
In a number of the studies just described, various priming techniques were
used to demonstrate the effects of automatic stereotype activation on
behavior. It has long been argued that racial primes facilitate stereotype-
consistent responses because of spreading activation, the process through
which activation of particular constructs (e.g., racial category labels)
increases the accessibility of related constructs (e.g., stereotypically associ-
ated traits) in semantic memory and decreases the accessibility of unrelated
constructs (e.g., counterstereotypic traits; see Higgins, 1996; Schank &
Abelson, 1977). This hypothesized memory structure provides a concise
explanation for the faster response latencies typically associated with
stereotype-consistent prime-word pairs, which are assumed to reside near
one another in semantic space and thus require less time to “spread” acti-
vation from the category to the trait, compared with stereotype-violating
prime-word pairs, which are assumed to occupy more distant semantic
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390 PERSON PERCEPTION, STEREOTYPING, AND PREJUDICE
FIGURE 17.4. Inhibition errors (panel A) and ERP waveforms elicited over the
midline frontocentral cortex (panel B) on stop trials as a function of alcohol dose
and trial type. Increased inhibition errors (panel A) on stereotype-consistent (SC)
trials relative to stereotype-violating (SV) trials indicate difficulty inhibiting race-
biased behaviors. The larger negative slow wave (NSW) amplitude associated with
stereotype-consistent trials in the placebo group (panel B) indicates greater imple-
mentation of cognitive control resources to inhibiting responses on those trials.
Time zero indicates onset of the stop signal. The decrease in NSW amplitude associ-
ated with the high alcohol dose indicates alcohol-induced impairment of cognitive
control. Adapted from Bartholow, Dickter, and Sestir (2006).
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spaces (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1986; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams,
1995; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983).
Recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience studies of response con-
flict suggests an alternative explanation for response facilitation in priming
paradigms. As discussed previously, response conflict occurs when a well-
learned or prepotent response must be overridden by an alternative
response in order to respond correctly in a given context. A classic para-
digm used to induce response conflict is the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen &
Eriksen, 1974), in which a target stimulus (e.g., a letter) is flanked by so-
called noise stimuli. The participant’s task is to categorize the target by
pressing one of two keys. A very robust response facilitation is produced in
this task on low-conflict, compatible trials (when the target and flankers
are identical; e.g., HHHHH) compared with high-conflict, incompatible
trials (when the target and flankers represent opposing categories; e.g.,
SSHSS). Research shows that the lateralized readiness potential (LRP)—a
response-locked component of the ERP that reflects motor cortex activity
associated with instigating behavioral responses—reveals initial activation
of incorrect response channels preceding activation of the correct response
on high-conflict trials in this task (for a review, see Coles, Smid, Scheffers,
& Otten, 1995). This initial activation of the incorrect response requires
some degree of effort (and time) to reverse, leading to longer response
latencies on high-conflict trials (see Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, &
Donchin, 1988). To the extent that responding to stereotype-incongruent
prime-word pairs induces response conflict, incorrect response activation
that occurs on such trials could provide an alternative account for the lon-
ger response latencies in racial priming experiments. This response activa-
tion should be evident in the LRP.
To test this assertion, Bartholow and Dickter (2006) recently con-
ducted a series of experiments using a modified Eriksen flanker task in
which the targets were facial photos of blacks and whites and the flankers
were words associated with cultural stereotypes for blacks and whites. In
this case, compatible trials were defined as those in which the race of the
target was congruent with the stereotypicality of the flanker words (e.g., a
black face flanked by violent) and incompatible trials were those in which
the target’s race was incongruent with the stereotypicality of the flanker
words (e.g., a white face flanked by violent). The participants’ task was
simply to categorize the target person as white or black by pressing one of
two keys, while attempting to ignore the flanker words.
In their first experiment, Bartholow and Dickter (2006) simply mea-
sured response latencies on compatible and incompatible trials. The data
showed that participants were faster to categorize targets by race when
they were flanked by stereotype-congruent than by stereotype-incongruent
words, suggesting that response conflict occurs in this version of the para-
digm even though the flankers were not associated with either response and
shared only an implicit semantic relationship with the targets. However,
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these data do not directly address whether the slowed categorization of
incongruent flankers results from initial activation of the incorrect response
channel. (See Amodio, Chapter 16, this volume, for a fuller account of this
and related studies.)
To address this question, Bartholow and Dickter (2006) added LRP
measures in Experiment 2. These waveforms are presented in Figure 17.5.
According to the logic of the LRP (see Coles et al., 1995), cortical activity
associated with incorrect response activation results in a positive-going
waveform, whereas correct response activation is associated with negative
voltage (see also DeJong, Liang, & Lauber, 1994; Gratton et al., 1988). As
shown in Figure 17.5, correctly categorized incompatible trials tended to
elicit a small (but significant) degree of incorrect response activation (seen
as the initial positive-going “dip” in the waveform around 50 ms) prior to
the activation of the correct response. In contrast, compatible trials were
associated only with correct response activation. LRP activity also can be
used to infer when behavioral responses will be emitted (see Gratton et al.,
1988). The horizontal dotted lines in Figure 17.5 represent hypothetical
response thresholds for commission of correct (upper line) and incorrect
(lower line) responses. Examining the point at which the LRP waveform
crosses this threshold in each condition provides a visual representation of
392 PERSON PERCEPTION, STEREOTYPING, AND PREJUDICE
FIGURE 17.5. Lateralized readiness potential (LRP) waveforms elicited on stereo-
type-congruent trials (i.e., compatible trials; solid line) and stereotype-incongruent
trials (incompatible trials; dashed line), measured over left and right motor cortex
areas. The “error dip” evident in the incompatible-trials waveform indicates initial
activation of the incorrect response at the neural level prior to the correct response
being activated and emitted.
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the delay in response latency caused by initial incorrect response activation
in the incompatible condition. Thus these data suggest that stereotype-
incongruent trials result in slower behavioral responses because they ini-
tially engender activation of the incorrect response, delaying activation of
the correct response. This interpretation is at odds with notions from
spreading activation theory that stereotype-incongruent constructs are acti-
vated slowly because of their distance from racial categories in semantic
memory. Instead, these data support a response-conflict account, whereby
responses are activated quickly at the neural level but the initial activation
is incorrect. It is this “confused” activation of both response channels that
slows response latency. This finding has a number of implications. For our
purposes here, one important implication is that ERPs provide a more com-
plete understanding of the apparent interference caused by stereotype-
related contextual information during racial categorization than could be
gained with reaction time measures alone. In this way, this study stands as
a clear example of the promise of the social-cognitive neuroscience ap-
proach, which holds that processes of interest can be best understood when
examined at the social, cognitive, and neural levels of analysis (see Ochsner
& Lieberman, 2001).
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this chapter was to outline ways in which electrocortical mea-
sures can be used to answer important theoretical questions in person per-
ception. As the research reviewed here demonstrates, ERPs provide an
additional tool for the experimental social psychologist’s arsenal of meth-
ods. We contend, however, that ERPs are most fruitfully employed in con-
junction with more traditional behavioral methods. Most important, ERPs
are only as effective in solving theoretical dilemmas as the experimental
designs in which they are applied (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 2003; Willingham
& Dunn, 2003). It is our hope that this chapter, along with the other chap-
ters in this volume, will inform researchers as to the potential value of
including the ERP and other physiological measures in their research pro-
grams.
In closing, it is important to briefly address when researchers should
choose ERPs as opposed to other measures of brain function. A host of
other psychophysiological measures not discussed in this review, including
(but not limited to) brain imaging techniques designed to specify which
brain structures and systems underlie social cognitive processes (e.g., func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging; fMRI), also are now important tools
for social neuroscientists interested in person perception (e.g., see Phelps et
al., 2000; Richeson et al., 2003). Deciding which kind of neural measure(s)
to use is driven by theoretical, as well as practical, considerations. On the
practical side, electrophysiological measures (such as ERPs) can be em-
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ployed at far less cost than fMRI and can be incorporated into a social cog-
nition lab with relatively modest physical renovations and technical exper-
tise. Acquiring fMRI technology requires a substantial, often institution-
wide, commitment of financial and personnel resources to purchase and
operate a magnet and construct a space in which to house it. More impor-
tant, ERPs and fMRI are simply suited to addressing different theoretical
questions. In general, ERPs are among the best tools available for specify-
ing the temporal sequence of cognitive processes associated with social per-
ception, but their usefulness for determining the neural sources of these
processes is limited (but see Koles, 1998). In contrast, fMRI provides ex-
ceptional spatial resolution but, at least at present, poor temporal resolu-
tion (on the order of 4–6 seconds poststimulus). An ideal scenario for many
researchers would involve the combined use of ERPs and fMRI in order to
specify both spatial and temporal parameters of the neural events underly-
ing person perception. Some relatively new technologies combining these
properties already have been applied in cognitive neuroscience (e.g., see
Gratton & Fabiani, 1998). Use of such techniques has promise for fostering
further links between social and biological approaches and for advancing
our understanding of the neural machinery driving social-psychological
phenomena.
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